106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
in The
by Joseph C. Haines, Lt. Col. AUS
(Ret)
106th Recon Platoon Leader, World War II
What
Really Happened at
Ltc Joseph C. Haines as a Reserve Officer November 1959
Part of the 2nd Platoon, 106th Recon Troop during Basic Training,
Since World War II, I have read numerous
accounts about the
Some of the ‘reports’ I've read are – Col. R. Ernest Dupuy’s book, St. Vith: Lion In The Way (reprint 1986, pp 50) states; "As the morning waxed, and the 423rd reports 16 December as “clear and cold,” it was evident that the enemy had taken Grosslangenfeld in the 424th Infantry sector.... As a matter of fact, we were still fighting in Grosslangenfeld until early afternoon on the 17th!! Then, on pp 55, Col. Dupuy states; The 106th Reconnaissance Troop at Grosslangenfeld disintegrated, opening Cannon Company’s left flank.... The Germans actually advanced between the Cannon Company of the 424th Infantry and the 106th Recon Troop.
WE DID NOT DISINTEGRATE!!!
And, on pp 57; "Personnel carriers rolling
in from Grosslangenfeld disgorged wave after wave of infantry..... Later, on pp
58, he mentions ....some infiltrating enemy from Grosslangenfeld... ALL of
these statements are false!! The actual facts are that NO enemy troops or
vehicles passed through Grosslangenfeld until mid-afternoon of the second day —
December 17th!! These unsupported statements by Col. Dupuy are a gross insult
to the men of the 106th Reconnaissance Troop who fought valiantly in defense of
their untenable position at Grosslangenfeld; completely cut off from other
American Units, surrounded by the enemy, out of communication and nearly out of
ammunition.
Unfortunately, these same untruths were
repeated by Charles B. MacDonald in his book A Time for Trumpets; as well as
being noted by several members of our Troop in various other so-called
‘official accounts’ written about the
The following account has been compiled from
my memory of these days; plus, the collective memories of some of the survivors
of the Troop with whom I have either talked or corresponded over the years:
i.e. – Paul Thompson, Richard Bradbury, William O. Tower, Arthur LaCroix,
Calvin Lezzi, Howard Hughes, Edward Fleming, Robert House, Earl Liston, Michael
Gresh, Jr., Willis Selje, Kenneth Booz, Abraham Freund, John Simpson, Robert
Fisher, Louis Cunningham, Rudy Aittama, Ralph Pope, Michael Liskiewicz, Bill
Roub, Roger Frambs, Rishel White, and the late William W. Randall, Roy
Mechling, Myron Johnstone, Edward McGee, Gene Hammond, Al Orzolek, Robert
Madsen; plus, no doubt others I can't quite recall. The Troop was organized on
From the Tennessee Maneuvers we moved to
In
We were attached to the 424th Infantry
Regiment, and on
(Note: At this time, the Troop T.O.& E.
authorized –
6 officers;
149 enlisted men;
13 - M-8 Armored Cars;
99 - .30-caliber M-1 carbines;
13 - .30-caliber machine guns (light);
3 - .50-caliber machine guns;
30 - .45-caliber submachine guns;
5 - Rocket Launchers A.T.;
9 - 60 mm mortars;
26 - .30-caliber M-l Rifles;
24 - l/4 ton trucks;
5 - M-3 halftracks; and
1 - 2&l/2 ton truck (mess truck)
We were positioned facing the Siegfried Line,
with the 424th Infantry Regiment’s Cannon Company on our right (we could
not see their nearest position to us) and Troop B, 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron on our left (nor could we see their nearest position to us either).
Most of our vehicles were placed where we couldn't readily utilize them. We had
a full complement of officers and about 85% of our authorized enlisted
personnel and attempted to man the positions vacated by the Rifle Company in
Grosslangenfeld. We were forbidden to test fire our machine guns and 37 mm
cannons on the armored cars, or to fire in our final protective line. We were
ordered to use the range cards previously established by the Rifle Company so
the Germans would believe the same Unit was still in place. There were no
provisions for artillery support, or any other supporting fire for us. We were
told this was a quiet sector or rest camp!! Since we were forbidden to use our
radios, our only
communication with other Units was a telephone
line to the 424th Infantry Regiment. (It was years later that we learned all
the other Units in the area had radio contact with Division.)
The only contact we could recall from the ‘outside’ was the visit by a Red Cross Doughnut Mobile on the 13th or 14th of December that served us coffee and doughnuts, complete with music and the smiles of two American women!
At approximately
During the shelling and early ground attacks, three of our men were seriously wounded — Sgt. Arthur LaCroix, T/5 Willis Selje, and Pfc Robert House. Since our only medical service consisted of platoon medics, the Troop Commander decided to send the wounded to the rear. A halftrack was disarmed, and red crosses affixed to the sides, to transport the wounded to the nearest medical facility. Along with the driver, T/5 James Guthrie, volunteers Medic Abraham Freund and Supply Clerk Cpl. Howard Hughes accompanied the wounded. The volunteers were to deliver our wounded to a medical facility, report our situation, rearm, draw as much ammunition as they could transport and return to our position. They never returned. (Years later, it was learned they had successfully reached St. Vith, delivered the wounded (all survived their wounds), reported our situation, rearmed, drew a supply of ammunition, and attempted to return to Grosslangenfeld. Unfortunately, by the time they were able to begin the return trip, German troops had moved into the area between St. Vith and Grosslangenfeld.)
Shortly after the German attack began early on the 16th of December, our telephone lines were cut to the 424th Infantry Regiment. We were now out of communication with anyone. The Troop Commander sent out mounted patrols to both flanks in an attempt to make contact with adjacent units (Cannon Company of the 424th and Troop B, 18th CAV). The patrol to the left flank returned to report they had made contact with Troop B, 18th CAV, and were told; We thought you guys were wiped out!!.... Heavy firing was heard on our right flank during this period, and the patrol we sent to the right flank (Cannon Company) did not return; nor did we receive a report from them since we were forbidden to use our radios.
Once the fighting started on the 16th, we
uncovered our Armored Cars and began firing the 37 mm cannon at the attacking
German troops. Since these guns were received new in
Early on the morning of the 17th of December,
the enemy ground attacks and shelling resumed. We were successful in repulsing
the ground attacks, but were running critically short of ammunition. Around
Course of action two was adopted and orders (verbal) were issued that on a given signal we would break contact, one position at a time, and attempt to reach Schönberg to the north. The order of withdrawal was to be First Platoon (Lt. Edward McGee), Headquarters & Headquarters Platoon (Capt. Million and Lt's. George Vaream & Leonard Prosnick), Second Platoon (Lt. Joseph Haines), and, last, Third Platoon (Lt. Myron Johnstone).
Our withdrawal began shortly after 1300 with
the First Platoon successfully breaking contact and withdrawing as planned.
Headquarters and part of Headquarters Platoon then fell in line behind First
Platoon and began their withdrawal. Second Platoon managed to break contact
with two thirds of the Platoon intact and joined the withdrawal (the third
section of Second Platoon was cutoff by advancing German troops and unable to
complete the withdrawal). The Third Platoon leader had arrived late to the
officer’s meeting and either misunderstood the direction of withdrawal or
discovered the planned route was now blocked by the enemy (I believe the latter
to be the case); as he attempted to withdraw back the way we had initially
entered Grosslangenfeld — from Winterspelt to the west and the area of the
424th Infantry Regiment. Their first vehicle in line was struck and disabled by
a mortar or artillery shell thereby blocking the road (possibly by “friendly
fire”, since it had been reported to others in our sector that “Grosslangenfeld
had fallen” the previous day (on the 16th)). Lt. Johnstone was “slightly”
wounded when a mortar shell exploded on the rail of his halftrack. The enemy
was then able to quickly overrun those still remaining in Grosslangenfeld
— which included the Third Platoon, parts of Headquarters Platoon, and
the third section of Second Platoon. During this brief encounter of intensive
fighting, several members of the Troop were killed or wounded. The wounded and
other survivors were quickly taken prisoner and marched to the rear into
The sections of the Troop that managed to withdraw proceeded in a northerly direction on the paved road that ran through Grosslangenfeld toward Bleialf. However, attempting to avoid contact with the enemy, we decided to leave this major roadway and travel cross country, with the hopes of making contact with friendly forces. Shortly after leaving the paved road, we entered a deserted village (Winterscheid - in the 423rd Infantry Regiment area) where we stopped to put tire chains on our vehicles. Resuming our trek, we met up with elements of Troop B, 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron at a crossroads just outside Winterscheid. They were really surprised to see us – they thought we had been “eliminated” the day before (December 16th). It was decided we would join them in the attempt to reach Schönberg. Troop B, 18th CAV, attached to the 423rd, had been given approval by radio to withdraw the day before - December 16th!! We were not aware of this decision, which left our left flank completely exposed.
We fell in behind Troop B, 18th CAV, and continued northward on secondary roads toward Schönberg. During our journey, we were under occasional artillery fire, including some tree bursts, until it began to get dark. We stopped on a wooded knoll just short of Schönberg to confer with the officers of Troop B, 18th CAV. After a short conference, it was decided we would break up into small groups and attempt to infiltrate the lines west toward St. Vith and get back to what we hoped would be American territory.
We disabled our vehicles, guns, and radios;
then walked a short distance into the woods to what appeared to be a
woodcutter’s shack. It was then decided we would spend the night here and see
what the situation was in the morning. Just after daylight on
The greatest irony of all is the fact that the 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was deployed as Infantry (replacing a Rifle Company in the defense) prior to any combat activity in the area. And, we fought as Infantry — although we had not been trained or equipped as Infantry — yet, we were not considered eligible for the Combat Infantry Badge. Nor, have we ever been considered for any of the other medals or accolades deservedly heaped onto all the other Units in the area on that day that did their duty exactly as we did because of all the inaccurate and misinformation recorded about us in so-called “official” records!!
I have had no contact with anyone from the
Troop who said they had ever been interviewed “officially” about what we did or
did not do during this period of
The remainder of 106th Recon Troops - after the
Bulge that were not taken POW.
This account as written is the truth of what
really happened, and to prove the 106th RECONNAISSANCE TROOP DID
NOT DISINTEGRATE on
Joseph C. Haines
Contact 106th Infantry Division Association For loads of information on the 106th as well as other WWII Infantry Divisions that trained at Camp Atterbury, Indiana
Go to http://www.indianamilitary.org/
http://www.mm.com/user/jpk
Installed
Revised:
Copyright © 1996- John Kline