FEATURING THE 424TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
106th Infantry Division
December 16, 1944 through
December 31, 1944
A summary of an article
published in November 1998 The CUB magazine
a publication of the 106th
Infantry Division Association
Editor, John Kline
Constituted
Committed to combat in the European Theater of
Operations and landed in
By 19 December the 424th was the last effective
regiment of the 106th Infantry Division, the 422d and 423rd Regiments having
surrendered to the German Army in the Schoenberg sector of
It was then withdrawn to
It fought at Meyerode and around St Vith. The
unit was then attached to the 99th Infantry Division (5-9 February 1945). It
advanced along the high ground between the Berk and Simmer Rivers until it
reached the Olds on
Withdrawn from the line, given a security
mission along the
Returned to the
424TH COMBAT INFANTRY
REGIMENT
106th Infantry Division
CAMPAIGNS WORLD WWII:
Ardennes-Alsace (
DECORATIONS:
BELGIAN FOURRAGERE 1940 (424th Infantry cited per DA GO 45, 1950)
Cited in the ORDER OF THE DAY of the Belgian Army
for action in the
“NO MATTER THE ODDS”
From a 106th Infantry Division News Letter -
The Regimental Crest which is displayed in the
local Red Cross Club game room was designed by Cpl Harold Boye, it has been
submitted to the War Department for official confirmation.
The huge, bronze colored Lion, symbolizes the feats
of the “Fighting Lion” Division and the 424th Regiment in particular. The Lion
is flanked by a Wermacht Eagle for contact with the enemy in
at the start of the "
For a map of the 424th positions on 16 December 1944 Click on this
For a chart describing the symbols on the 424th Position
Map Click on this
****************************************************
424th Infantry - "After
Note: In general, all personal
reports will be full paragraphs "12 pt Italic."
Some "italic"
emphasis is given to individual words and phrases.
Robert C. Ringer, 591st Field
Artillery Battalion, Service Battery
Personal Report
As Ammunition Officer for the 591st Field
Artillery Battalion, 105 mm Howitzer, the Direct Support Battalion of the 424
Infantry Regiment, I was an observer of what went on over a wide area.
Most authors if they say anything, state that
the 424th Regiment made a disorganized withdrawal to the west. On the contrary,
both withdrawals were expertly conducted by Col. A. Reid and his people. The
proof is that the units in eluding the artillery lived to fight another day.
The Infantry and Artillery Supply units cooperated in every way. On
The Infantry and Cpt.. James Wells Engineers
returned the favor by clearing a trail to get our guns out of Heckhalenfeld.
We fired 50,000 artillery rounds from 10
December until
In addition to the Infantry, I would like to
praise LTC Philip Hoover and CPT. M. M. Dolitsky of our
****************************************************
After Battle Report with
"interlaced" personal reports by individual soldiers.
HEADQUARTERS 424th Infantry
AFTER
ending
To: Commanding General, 106 Inf. Division, APO 443, U.S. Army
At the close of November, a warning order was
given for movement to the continent, and the regiments left the billeted areas
December 2nd for
Finally on 6 December, the sea calmed enough to
permit debarkation, and the regiment landed at
The move to the front line area took two days and a
night of constant travel. The route cut across northern
The Division had received orders to replace the 2nd
Division in the front lines, in the St. Vith area facing the Siegfried
line so the 424th went into bivouac a few miles west of St. Vith while awaiting
final replacement plans to be drawn up by the 424th and the 23rd, which it was
relieving. The regiment closed-in 10 December and stayed there until 12
December in a blanketing snow storm interspersed with sleet and rain.
The 424th Infantry moved into the front lines for
the first time in its history when it relieved the 23rd Infantry of the 2nd
Division on 7,000 yards frontage in the St. Vith sector of the Belgium-German
border. With positions on the western edge of the Siegfried line the 3d
Battalion took over prepared emplacements on the left, or north flank and the
2d Battalion moved into the right half of the front lines, adjacent to the 28th
Infantry Division. The 1st battalion was kept in reserve at
Steinebruck. In the 3d Battalions, K Company, was on the left and L
Company on the right, with I Company in reserve. The 2d Battalion placed
F Company on the left, G on the right, and E in reserve. Cannon Company
cemented a gap between the 2d Battalion and the 106 Recon troop. The
423rd was on the left.
In the overall tactical picture the commanding
General had put the 422nd Infantry to the left on the Division front, the 423rd
in the troublesome center sector, and the 424th on the south or right
flank. The Regimental CP.. was at Heckhalenfeld and the Division CP.. at
St. Vith.
The regiment made the replacement move without
incident, turning its personnel carrying trucks over to the 23rd. The
operation was completed by 1530. No artillery, air, or ground
interference was encountered.
First physical contact with the enemy was
established at 1830 the same day when the 3d Battalion reported an enemy patrol
in front of its lines and requested artillery fire on the patrol. At the
same time A Company received the regiment’s actual baptism of fire when 10
rounds of mortar landed in this forward area, wounding two men, the first
casualties from intimate action in the regiment. The two men were private
Harold E. Shagrin and Pvt. Fosse. Both received Purple Hearts, the first in the
regiment. More mortar fire landed in the G Company area at 2050.
At approximately the same time, the first of a
series of fires started in the regimental area. Company C, 81st Engineers,
reported one of its small personnel hutment's burning. It was brought
under control with only the loss of personal equipment and radio.
Service Company, however, had more trouble in its
area. Stationed at ALCHERATH, a fire broke out in a three story structure
in which were quartered members of the 2d Battalion motor pool. One man,
Pvt. Theron McCollum, H Company, was burned to death in the fire. At the
height of the fire, Capt. Uhel Barrickman, MTO, reported a shot was fired at
him in the dark. Movements were seen in the brush near the burning house
and the two instances of light signals from an adjoining civilian house were
noticed. The CIC was called on the case.
The rest of the night was quiet, was a minimum of
patrol activity by both sides.
The next day saw another fire destroy Regimental
Headquarters. All records and personal effects, however, were removed.
All fires were found have been started from carelessness, not sabotage.
John Connors, 424/HQ
2BN Dec 12
Personal Report
I was the Motor Transportation
Officer in the 2nd Battalion of the 424th. After arriving in St. Vith in early
December ‘44, with all of the Battalion vehicles .Our CO ordered me to go back
to Quartermaster to get trucks to move all of our personnel to the front. When
I returned in a day or so we loaded all the men in the trucks and transported
them to the front line positions being held by elements of the 2nd Division in
the Grosskampenberg area. This was about 3 or 4 days before the 16th, I
believe. I then took my men and the Battalion vehicles back to an old deserted
farm house to use as a Motor Pool and billet. After deploying the vehicles and
setting up a 24 hour guard roster all of us , except the guard on duty, crawled
in to our sleeping bags to get some rest. Around
John P. Dimeglio, 424/I Dec
12
At LeHavre, France we were
issued some new equipment and some ammunition. We lined up to be issued
galoshes. There were only two sizes left size 8 and size 10 (I wear a size 11
shoe). We had to sign and accept the small size that we couldn’t get on. We
discarded the small boots into a large pile. The lack of rubber boots was to
cost us much pain in the Bulge. We were trucked up to the front on Dec. 12th to
relieve the 2nd Division. They led us to dugouts that held about eight men. # #
# - Dimeglio
General Perrin made his first visit to the 424th front lines when he, along with Colonel Reid, toured the 3rd Battalion positions, interviewing Capt. Richard Comer, K Company Commander. The General also visited the Regimental CP.
14 -
Hubert Hochstetter
(dscd) 424/I Dec 15
Regimental Headquarters was at
Winterspelt. Battalion Headquarters at Heckhalenfeld, with K and L companies on
line in the area of Heckhuscheid, K Company on the right and L Company on the
left, with a light machine gun section of I Company to the left of L Company.
There was a gap of about 600 to 1200 yards to the left of the battalion
positions between 3rd Battalion end Cannon Company which was online as a rifle
company to the west of Eigelscheid. An outpost manned by I Company was
established between 3rd Battalion and Cannon Company. The remainder of I
Company was in reserve.
3rd Battalion took over its
area from the 2nd Division on
Robert Shaw (dscd) 424/H
Dec 14
I haven’t seen much mention of
what the second battalion of the 424th was doing. I believe we were one of few
units, if not the only one to hold their position until about
Our survival started on Dec
14. In mid morning I was notified I would have to turn in one half of my 81mm
mortar ammunition. My CO claimed I had no use for so much and it was needed in
the
About seven o’clock that
night, Mark came into my C P and said he had found what I needed. I went out
and he and Chuck Garn, whom I know you have met, had a trailer loaded with the
stuff. We stacked it covered it with branches and snow, and felt real good
about the deal. ### Shaw
Robert M. Shaw (dscd)
Dec 15
On the fifteenth, about four
o’clock the Bn Commander called and asked if I had placed all my sections where
they were supposed to be. Of course I hadn’t for two of the positions were
strictly suicide spots and the guns and crew wouldn’t last no time at all if
there was a fire fight. The third section was set so close to the top of the
hill, every time they fired the muzzle blast would be seen by the Germans
across the valley. I was given one hour to move both sections or be relieved.
The third section under Lt. Duane McKay, left immediately. The second section I
sent up into the woods to get out of sight, with orders to return as soon as it
got dark. Their position was in back of the line about one hundred yards. They
would catch every shell overshooting the main line. ###- Shaw
16 December 1944 This date saw the biggest German attack since D-Day
directed at the U.S. 1st Army, with the bulk of the attack coming at St. Vith,
around which the 106th Division was deployed in defensive positions. First
indication that the attack was coming was a report from K Company at 0140 that
heavy mortar fire was falling in its area. The real pre-attack artillery
barrage started promptly at 0540 with intensive fire all along the regiments
front. At 0550 K Company saw the first enemy activity, with the infantry moving
toward the regiment under cover of the artillery. By 0615, an estimated company
of enemy had penetrated the K an L area.
By this time, German artillery had broken all wire
communications with the battalions and with division. Only contact was by
liaison officer and radio. At daylight, one squad of K Company had been forced
back out of its original position and a force of enemy had penetrated to the L
Company CP.. At 0810 another general bombardment was sent all along the front.
A German force forged in between the 2nd Battalion on the
right and the 112th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion C.O.
sent a platoon of G Company to fill the gap
Cannon Company in the meantime had been overrun and
Captain Freesland, the C.O. appealed for assistance from the reserve battalion,
which was under Division control. C Company was dispatched to the
At
During the first day, many acts of individual
heroism were recorded. Captain Lee Berwick, 3rd
Battalion S-3, was sent with a squad of men to clear the enemy from buildings
in the CP.. area. Braving enemy fire, he exposed himself and called for the
group in one building to surrender. Their answer was a burst of fire. He
deployed his men then called on the enemy again to surrender. They raised the
white flag and out of the building came two officers, 105 enlisted men
and two American officers and 15 American enlisted men who had been held
as prisoners.
In the 1st Battalion area at
Winterspelt, Lt. Cl. Lamar A. Welch and his battalion staff were in their CP..
when they heard German voices outside the window. All dived for their weapons
and raced outside. Just as they cleared the building a stick of grenades
completely destroyed the CP..
Anti-tank Company had a big day, too. Staff
Sergeant Rocco P. DeFelice was knocked unconscious by a shell burst. Rousing
himself, he went back to his gun and promptly was wounded by another enemy
shell. He dragged himself back to the gun and directed fire that destroyed two
German tanks. TSgt Glenn D. Risk took over another gun by himself, doing his
own loading, aiming and firing. He got a tank too. Pvt. Gilbert Thomas manned a
bazooka and he also stopped a tank. Service Company at Elcherath saw its first
action Sunday, when the enemy struck from around Winterspelt and surrounded the
Company position. The company evacuated its area by the only possible route
out, a back trail, on Sunday afternoon. Capt. Uhel Barrackman, MTO, was
credited with saving two vehicles and personnel as the members of the company
set up an effective rearguard action.
John P. Dimeglio 424/I
Dec 16
The Germans began their attack
that night. We were ordered out of the dugouts to form a skirmish line behind
the dugouts. There was firing all night at what we conceived to be the enemy.
The next morning we could clearly see the untouched snow, there were no Germans
out there. ###-
Dimeglio
Hubert Hochstetter 424/I
Dec 16
On December 16th our
Heckhuscheid positions were subjected to heavy artillery, mortar and rocket
fire. This was my first experience with Screaming Meemies. My platoon was in
the chow line when the call came to assemble immediately and proceed to high
ground behind Heckhuscheid. I set up there and learned that a portion of L
Company had been overrun. I was ordered to leave a squad (this was a short
squad since some men were out) and with the other two squads proceeded to set
up positions to protect and then attack the L Company area that had been
overrun. Sometime later I sent one squad to the right of the buildings that
were occupied by the Germans and some L Company prisoners. The other squad I
led in a frontal attack. This took place some time had gone by with Battalion
Staff and our men attempting talk the Germans into surrendering. When my squad
and I reached a position about 30 yards from the German positions and my
enveloping squad neared the positions and we both opened fire, the Germans did surrender
and we recovered the L Company men who had been taken prisoner. I lost one man
killed in this counterattack
My estimate is that more than
a half of battalion of Germans were killed in this area in the attack and our
counter attack. The I Company gun section had continued to hold position and
covered the left flank of the of the Battalion and L Company. They were in a
defilade position and accounted for many of the German dead. K Company was also
attacked but held on to their positions.
My platoon was assigned to
hold the positions of L Company that we had retaken. We did this for the rest
of the day, that night, and until the next evening. During this time we had
skirmishes with patrols but no real attacks. During the night we could hear the
sound of burp guns closing to our rear at what seemed to be about 2 miles. ###-
Hochstetter
Robert Lyons 424/HQ
Dec 16
Lester Helmich and I were
together at the 424th Regimental Headquarters Company at
Orders came to us that the
company would walk out of the area at
Like most of the 424th
Regiment, Company F moved into front-line positions on December 12,1944. I was
an exception, arriving on the 15th because of guard responsibilities at our
previous campsite. We were at the very end of the many miles of front covered
by the 106th Division. The next unit was Company B, 112th Regiment of the 28th
Division, Associate Member Charlie Haug’s unit.
When the big noise started in
the early morning of December 16, Company F wasn't doing too badly on their
hillside perches looking toward the
Robert M. Shaw (dcsd)
424/H Dec 16
At twelve minutes after
At this point, Castro and Lt.
McKay shouted over their phones, that they had just heard a tail gate drop. I
repeated this to Bn and requested permission to shoot. My CO told we when he
heard the first shot, he would start filing charges against me.
At
We fired until daylight, and
then only when a target was called. When the German attack came up the hill,
they were few in number and were slaughtered by the rifles and machine guns.
Every German was “dead.” The field was littered with their bodies.
At three o’clock a messenger
came up a trail between the two sections of our line carrying a message to
someone that we had been driven off the hill. He became a prisoner.
The report Headquarters made
was not right. I called Bn HQ at
In the afternoon of the 16th,
a rifleman over on the right side of our line near where Lt. McKay was located,
claimed he could smell food cooking and eventually slipped down through the
woods and came back with a mess kit full of food from a German chow line which
he shared with others near him. He and McKay plotted on a map where he thought
the kitchen was and we fired thirty six rounds in on it, We never knew if we
hit anything or not, but ten years later, a German DP who was working where I
was, claimed he was in that group and was getting ready to mount an attack but
the Mortars knocked them out. They had so many casualties the attack had to be
canceled.
I guess they didn't want to
admit they had been caught off guard. ###- Shaw
The general withdrawal of the regiment was
ordered on Sunday, (
John P. Dimeglio 424/I Dec 17
We moved up to attack the
Germans. We stopped at a hill top. Some Germans came out in the open to
surrender. They were fired on so they dashed back into the forest. We dug in on
the top of the hill that was covered with snow. It was a bad position, we were
too exposed in our green outfits. ###- Demiglio
Milton J. Schober 424/H
Dec 17
The following day, the 17th,
German awareness of a Anti-tank gun in our area resulted in barrages of
“screaming meemies” (Nebelwerfer) landing on our hillside. In the afternoon I,
with two others, was on duty at a lookout post when an incoming shell not heard
by us apparently landed just short of our position. We were knocked to the
ground and showered with dirt but had no injury other than severe ringing in
our ears.
After darkness word came down
for Company F to pack everything possible and to be ready to move out in twenty
minutes. Riflemen were each given two bandoleers of 30 caliber ammo, which in
itself is a load. This was the point at which most gas masks were abandoned. I
remember Russ Mayotte, one of the smaller men in the first platoon, cramming
everything possible into his knapsack to a point where he could barely lift it
on his shoulders. After a few miles through the woods up and down hills,
discarded ammo and other materials were quite noticeable along the trail. The big
killer after crossing the Our River was climbing the Our Berg south of
BURG-REULAND. We had been on the march for over four hours when we collapsed on
elevated farmland after
John P. Dimeglio 424/I
Dec 18
We were ordered to attack
again. This time my squad was told that we were to attack a farm house. In this
attack Sgt. Ira was wounded by machine gun fire. Some German in the farm house
had me picked out in his gun sight. I could hear the bullets whiz by me - my
heart was pounding like a pile drivers’ hammer. We moved up hitting the ground
every few yards. As we continued to attack, only one man and myself reached the
farm house. When we were about twenty yards away, a platoon of Germans came out
and surrender to us. We started to move them back to the rear. As we moved back
the Germans fired artillery on their own men. We all scattered and hit the
ground. The Germans did not try to escape, they could of easily overpowered the
two of us. When we reached a rear position we turned over the prisoners to an
officer. We then were loaded up with ammunition and sent back to the front.
John P. Dimeglio
424/I Dec. 19
What was left of the squad was then sent up to
reinforce
Hugh Hochstetter (dscd),
424/I Dec 17 - 18
My Platoon was assigned to
cover the ordered Battalion withdrawal after dark on the 17th. Our
promised guide was not at the Battalion HQ area which was deserted. So, I made
the decision to take the road to Winterspelt. I had been given no orders as to
the direction of the withdrawal. I mistakenly assumed that Regiment is always
safe as my reasoning for this decision. As we went down the road in the dark
(it was very dark since we had very low cloud cover) We ran into enemy fire. We
returned it and decided that was not the way to go. So we took off down the
only other road available. This took us by the Division Ammo dump which had
been set afire. We had a great display of fireworks
About 0200 hours on 18
December we arrived at the Our River near Berg Reuland. A little later the main
force of what was left of the Battalion arrived. We crossed the Our that
morning and set up positions in the village west of the river. There we had
some patrol activity until we withdrew a couple of days later. ###_ Hochstetter
Milton J. Schober 424/H
Dec 18
The morning of the 18th saw us
digging a defensive line. Our activity didn't go unnoticed at the farmhouse 500
yards further up the hill. The occupants came parading out, the lead person
carrying a pole with a white cloth attached as they moved off to the west. I
certainly sympathized with their action considering the appearance of a battle
shaping up in their front yard. That didn't turn out to be the case. Its fuzzy
in my mind as to whether we stayed one day or two days in the farm area but
when we did retreat a little further to a wooded area, it was at 2 a.m.
We left the latter wooded area
on the morning of December 21. Down the muddy roads we hiked, stopping
occasionally to put snow in our canteens or water from ruts in the mud (halogen
tablets added). The men moved in columns on each side of the road, with 5 yard
intervals, while jeeps and 6x6’s moved down the center of the road, bearing
ammo and equipment. It was evident that we were in another full scale retreat.
Food must have been in short supply because I remember eating a raw turnip
lying in a field, and I donut like turnips. Our suspicion that German forces
were in the vicinity was shortly confirmed. The noise of vehicles moving down
the road attracted the attention of their artillery observers and several
shells came screaming in about 100 yards short of the road. We had been
dragging along but this was the incentive we needed to double time out of that
locale. About five miles from our starting point we came to the village of
OUDLER where we saw several Sherman tanks on guard with their guns leveled down
the several roads leading into the village center. They were ready to meet the
Germans when they appeared. We kept moving through OUDLER and perhaps went
another four miles to reach THOMMEN, where we spent the night quartered in
houses. There was talk of conducting a raid with tanks to retake OUDLER which
had been captured by the Germans after we had moved through it earlier in the
day, but the plan was dropped. ###- Schober
On Wednesday, 20 December the Germans attacked
again. Elements of the 62nd Volksgrenadier and the 182nd
and 190th Regiments drove from the left front between Maspelt and
R.J. 515. The regiment held until another withdrawal was ordered the morning
of Friday the 22 December to form a perimeter defense around Commanster.
This was accomplished with the aid of a heavy snowfall which blinded the enemy
artillery and observation.
In this defense, the 424th
Combat Team came under control of the 7th Armored Division, minus the 3rd
battalion, which was sent to the 9th CCB. Also in
the defensive setup were the 9th Armored and the 112th
Combat Team.
By Saturday (
At 0700 Christmas Day, the 3rd
Battalion moved to the vicinity of Fays and the 2nd
Battalion to the vicinity of Harre. The 1st Battalion and
Regimental Headquarters went into Harre. The ? - ——— —— to Chene-Al-?ierre (?)
There with the 48th and 23rd Armored Infantry and
a platoon of tanks, the two attacked to secure Manhay, northern pivot point of
the German spearhead into
In the meantime, the 3rd
battalion was attached to CCA of the 7th Armored and the
remainder of the regiment was attached to CCB of the 7th
Armored. On Tuesday, 26 December, L Company was brought up on line on the left
of N15 and G Company was detached and put under control of CCB of the 38th
Infantry. The 1st Battalion remained in reserve 1,000 yards form
Grandmenil.
Tuesday (26th) afternoon that part
of the regiment attached to CCB was committed as a whole. L Company remained on
the left of N15, and the 2nd Battalion on the right and the 1st
Battalion extended the line to the right north of Grandmenil. That morning, the
2nd battalion attacked to close the gap between the 82nd
Airborne in Manhay and the 75th in Grandmenil and
moved to the very north edge of Manhay where all units dug in on line. The
forward Regimental CP.. was with the 2nd Battalion at Mont-Derroeux.
The battalion secured the east-west road lying approximately 400 yards north of
Manhay, key town on the liege highway.
The regiments remained on line until relieved by a
regiment of the 75th Division at 0404, 30 December.
On 27 December, Lt. Col. Leonard Umanoff, commander of the 2nd Battalion, was placed on special duty with division headquarters, and Lt. Col. Orville M. Hewitt, executive officer of the regiment, assumed command of the 2nd Battalion.
John P. Dimeglio 424/I
Dec. 20
to Dec 30
The weather turned freezing
cold. Two men and myself were picked to man a 50 caliber machine gun. We had
never fired a 50 caliber machine gun. The machine gun was located up front. It
was located in a makeshift position, in a hole about 18” deep. A soldier placed
my hand on the trigger and then left saying he had to go back. It was a dark
night, we heard and saw the outline of Germans in front of us but dared not
fire the gun. Our relief was to come in the morning. We waited a few hours
after daylight, now we had no choice but to leave the heavy gun there and move
back in search of our company. We then started back through the woods.
Dec. 21 We found a road and started
again to move back. A tank from the 7th Armored moving back asked us to climb
on top of the tank. They started moving fast because now we were under
artillery fire. On the first fast turn I was thrown off the tank onto the road.
I laid unconscious for a short time. A
Dec. 22 I left the M8 vehicle and joined a
group of men moving back on foot through the woods. That night we fell under
intense artillery fire. All we could do was lie down on the ground and pray. We
huddled in groups trying to get some protection from the terrain. Men were
moaning and praying from fear. We could see the fires in the town of
Dec. 23 I found my way back to my
own unit Co. “I” 424 Infantry. The cold and wind was unbearable. Three enlisted
men and myself were ordered into a foxhole overlooking the Our River. (I am
guessing this is the Our River.) Lt. Joseph had a command post in a farm
building behind us, on the other side of the road. An armored half track drove
over a bridge that was between our foxhole and his command post, and racked the
foxholes with machine gun fire. The half track was an American vehicle manned
by German soldiers. I could still see the White Star on the armored plating.
That night in that foxhole one man shot himself, he blew off some of his toes.
I called for the medics and they took him back to the First Aid station. On
another day another man went crazy, I again called the medics and they took him
back to the Aid Station. This all was going on in the freezing cold... we had no
blankets and very little food... we were slowing freezing to death. We
abandoned this position to move back on foot once again
Dec. 25 My boots were starting to
fall apart. My hands and feet were frozen. My body was bruised and cut from the
tank fall. It was Christmas night, we had not eaten a hot meal in all the time
we were in the Bulge. Lt. Joseph made some kind of an arrangement for the
platoon to sleep in the home of a
Dec. 26 We again pulled back on
foot. Now there were long lines of frozen men retreating down this road. The
wind and cold was terrible. As we marched back men began to fall like frozen
tree branches with too much ice on them. We stepped over the men that fell -
and prayed that a truck behind the long column would pick them up. That night
again we all slept on the frozen ground. My hands and feet were swollen from
the cold - my body could not stop shaking. We moved to a position on a small
hill and were told to dig in. We had no entrenching tools so we stacked stones
in front of our position and waited for the end. We now saw a long German
column coming up the road.
It was a freezing clear cold
day, suddenly American planes came down and strafed and bombed the German
columns time-after-time. After many attacks, the planes left leaving horses and
men dead - trucks and armored equipment burning. At last hope was near.
Dec. 28 I was assigned to help
with a half track unit that was laying mines on roads. We set mines during the
day, at night we slept under the half track in the freezing cold. The driver
gave us some K-rations to eat. In January I returned to my own unit.
Milton J. Schober, 424/H
, Dec 22 - Dec 30
On the 22nd we continued our
retreat until late afternoon when we came to a village where we were told to
set up a perimeter defense. I had long wondered the name of this village, and
thought it was either BRAUNLAUF or CROMBACH. It wasn't until my CRIBA friend,
Joseph Dejardin, furnished me with a number of interviews with 106th Division
people that I found one with Lt. Robert Logan, S-3 of 2nd Bn. stating the
perimeter defenses were set up by E Company around ALDRINGEN, F Company around
MALDINGEN and G Company west of BRAUNLAUF. So now I knew it was MALDINGEN that
we were defending on the morning of December 23. At a very early hour on this
date there was a bumper-to-bumper assembly of tanks, half-tracks, jeeps, you
name it. Where they had all come from I had no idea, but they were all lined up
on the road out of MALDINGEN. Someone yelled “Get on board” and in short order
most of F Company was clinging to some form of transport. I climbed on a
half-track. About this time our Company Captain protested to the Armored
Officer that his orders were to defend the village, to which the response was,
“You can stay if you want to, Captain, but were getting out of here!”
It seemed an eternity for
the column to move as the troops sat unprotected while some German shells
landed in the vicinity, with wounds resulting. I remember seeing men with the
28th Division's Bloody Bucket shoulder patch placing charges on trees to create
a road block. Finally, to our immense relief, we began moving, and speed picked
up when we reached the hard surfaced road running through BEHO and toward
SALMCHATEAU. We passed a handful of Belgian civilians, some on bicycles, most
with luggage, moving in our direction. It certainly wasn't a moral builder for
them to see us pulling back, but I know I felt exhilarated in getting out of
what seemed a hopeless situation. I had the impression that we were putting
miles between us and the Germans but in reality we were running parallel to
their thrust. I donut know where we crossed the
We had a peaceful day on
Christmas Eve watching heavy bomber formations flying east. I've written
previously about our disastrous attack Christmas Day at Manhay. F Company
suffered many casualties from German tank machine gun fire and apparently our
own artillery. We maintained a defensive posture in the Manhay-Grandmenil area
until December 30, when we were trucked back to the small Belgian
At the end of the first three weeks of combat for
the regiment, the casualty figures as of
Officers
17
Enlisted Men
233
KIA
Officers 3
EM 9
Officers 28
EM 534
MIA
Officers 14
Enlisted Men 502
Total Losses Officers 62
Enlisted Men 1,054
The three officers officially listed killed
were: Captain Oscar G. Krieger, Dental Surgeon, 20 December; 1st
Lt. Leslie C. Struble, 3rd Battalion S-2, 21 December; and 1st
Lt. Harry B. Stokes, executive officer,
The date of this report was January 1, after many days of sustained battle and movements. It is assumed that the large number of Missing in Action (MIA) was due to separation of units. Undoubtedly these numbers diminished on later reports.
As all this was happening to the 424th,
this was the picture in the sister regiments. The 422nd
and 423rd:
As the Germans attacked 16 December, they cut in
between the 424th, on the right, and the 422nd
and 423rd on the left. As the Nazi attack pounded on, it hooked
around St. Vith to the north and eventually surrounded the other two regiments.
Both regiments ran out of food and ammunition and were forced to surrender,
after a bitter fight.
In the defense thrown up by the 106th, the 424th received the strongest praise. Although on the secret list as far as the public was concerned, newspapers spoke of the “the green Division credited with splitting the Nazi drive at St. Vith.”
December 31st Star & Stripes said:
“At the important highway junction of St. Vith,
one of the primary objectives of the German drive elements of the so called
green Division made a heroic stand for several days. German intelligence
had probably figured the untried men of this outfit would break and run in the
face of a seemingly hopeless situation. As it was, they held against the
best they enemy could hurl against them until ordered to withdraw. Von
Runstedt’s timetable had miscarried already.”
The Division Commander, Brig. General Herbert F. Perrin directed that all troops of the 424th be assembled and the following read to them:
“The Commander of the 1st First Army and the 18th Corps compliment all officers and men of the 424th Infantry Regiment for their splendid accomplishment against the enemy in the last two weeks. Both the Army and Corps commanders want the personnel of the 424th Infantry to know they feel this regiment conducted itself fully up to the standards of the more seasoned troops in the line during that period. In addition, they have expressed the utmost confidence that the Division and the 424th will continue to reach these high attainments again in any duty they are called upon to perform in the near future.
“The Division commander is especially pleased at the opportunity for the regiment, assembled in the various battalion areas, to hear these words. He wishes it made known that he is proud of the conduct of the 424th in battle and reminds the regiment that the 424th now is carrying the colors for the entire division.
“The Regimental Commander adds his personal commendations to those on the higher headquarters. He expresses no doubt that the members of this regiment will continue to conduct themselves in future operations like to seasoned veterans they have become.”
After the relief from front-line action, the regimental CP.. moved to OCQUIER. The first Battalion went to OCHAIN and the 2nd and Antitank Company moved to WARZEE. Cannon and Service were at CLAVUER.
On 31 December, the first Battalion alerted one company and was furnished vehicles to completely motorize the unit against possible Airborne attack.
For the Commanding Officer:
Roy D. Underwood
Capt. 424th Infantry
Regimental Historian
16-30 December 1944
424th
Infantry Regiment
106th
Infantry Division
Declassified
Interview with Col. A.D. Reid,
regimental commander, 424th
Infantry Regiment, vicinity
Note: Straight lines " __ __ __ _ " denote unrecognizable text in the original reports.
In attempting to secure the background of the committal of the 1st Battalion, 424th Infantry, in the vicinity of Winterspelt on the first morning of the counterattack, I ask Colonel Reid whether there was any difficulty in securing its release from division control as division reserve. Colonel Reid looked at me silently for a few minutes, and then stated: “ I should lead with my chin? Tell me what you want to know about it.” I said that I gathered that the fortuitous presence of General Perrin, assistant division commander, on the morning of 16 December at the CP enabled C Company of the 1st battalion to be committed without clearance by General Jones, and also hastened the commitment of the remainder of the 1st Battalion which might have been delayed if General Perrin had not been in the area. Colonel Reid looked at me again for a few moments and replied: ”Let it stand at that." I should draw the conclusion from this and other remarks from his conversation that he felt that there was considerable delay before the 1st Bn was actually thrown in.
When the attack first hit, one platoon of G Company was placed into a gap between the south flank of the 424th and the north flank of the 112th infantry, “but after the Cannon Company was hit and the enemy started to converge on Winterspelt, I had to recall this platoon and thus rob both Peter and Paul to pay Winterspelt.”
Colonel Reid mentioned that his
biggest difficulty in controlling the regiment was their lack of sufficient
knowledge on the larger picture and how it effected the regimental front. “In
such a situation,” he said, “there is always the chance of whether you should
try to hold _ _ _ _ (despite the fact that there were insufficient troops
to do so), or whether you should balance on the balls of your feet and withdraw
strategically to fight a better battle another day. There never seemed to be
adequate information available on such things as strength, the breadth and
depth of the enemy penetration on the sectors outside of the regiment; the
availability of reinforcements and when they might arrive; and what was
developing in the plans of higher headquarters. So much was unconfirmed rumors.
It was difficult to keep up with the situation regarding the 9th and the 7th
Armored, and we heard rumors that the 10th Armored might
spearhead up from the south, or even that the 11th Armored might come east from
the
The breadth on the enemy attack makes it impossible to reduce it to a single spearhead in the 424th's sector, but the main force of the attack caught the left flank of the 3rd Battalion (in the northern part of the 424th's sector), the Cannon Company at Eigelscheid and the right (south) flank of the 106th Recon Troop at Grosskampenfeld. On the first day of the attack, the 3d battalion and the 2d battalion counterattacked to regain original lines, while the 1st Battalion was used from its original position as division reserve in preventing a major breakthrough at Winterspelt.
The initial regimental mission was to hold in place, and to aid this mission CCB of the 9th Armored Division arrived on 17 December to clear Winterspelt and then attack southeast from that town, to relieve the pressure on the north flank of the regiment. Then later in the day of the 17th, Division decided to withdraw back of the OUR River before the 9th Armored could fairly get started from its clearing mission.
When the _ _ _ _ regimental _ _ _ _ the Our River, from its original position at Heckhalenfeld back to Burg-Reuland at 210017 December, the primary regimental mission became one of holding open the Burg Reuland Road as a possible route for an armored counterattack. After the next withdrawal to the vicinity of Commanster, the regimental mission became one on establishing a perimeter defense, with the 3d battalion charged with the primary mission of protecting against possible counterattack from the northeast.
Withdrawing through Vielsalm, the 424th fought as Armored Infantry with the 7th Armored Division. The evacuation was aided as many of the troops rode out on tanks half tracks.
The decision to attach the 2d battalion, 424th Infantry, to CCA, 7th Armored in the vicinity of Manhay was reached because Colonel Reid deemed the 2d to be his strongest battalion at the time, and he received orders to attach one of his battalions as Armored Infantry infantry on 25 December. The general plan of the 7th Armored was to have the CCB execute a wide sweep southeast into the Manhay area, while CCA was then to move in and mop up. Colonel Reid stated that the “wide sweep” did not pan out as successfully as expected, it fell far short of the cavalry charge anticipated because of the heavy antitank gun opposition along the axis of the advance. Therefore, when CCA attacked with the 2d battalion, 424th, the slugging was very slow and the 2d Bn, 424, was cut up very badly just north of Manhay.
16 —
2d Battalion,
424th Infantry,
106th
Infantry Division
Declassified
Interview with Lt. Robert Logan, S-3 of 2d Bn, vicinity AISOMONT, Belgium, 10 January 1945; Interview with Lt. Colonel Orville Hewitt, Bn Commander of 2d Bn after 27 December, vicinity BRONHOMME, Belgium 8th January 1945 interviews by Capt. K. W. Hechler ,2d Info & History Service (VIII Corps.)
The 2d Bn was on the southern edge of the 424th Infantry front, with "G" Company on line on the left "F" Company online on the right. There was a gap of about the 950 yards between "F" Company and "B" Company, 112th Infantry, to the South. There was no available battalion reserve because two Platoons of "E" Company were being used patrol this gap to LUTZKAMPEN, while another platoon of "E" Company was patrolling along the road west of HECKHUSCHEID.
On 16 December, the 2d Bn received a heavy artillery barrage starting at 0530 and ending about one hour later, before daybreak. Apparently 3d Bn on the Bn's north flank was hit first, for firing was heard in that direction. The 2d Bn was not hit by enemy Infantry until 0730, "G" Company was engaged in a fire fight for about on hour, and "F" Company in a lighter fight for about one half an hour, but it was not serious, and no lines were penetrated in the 2d Bn area.
During the morning of 16th December, the Company Commander of B Company 112th Infantry, came into the 2d Bn CP.., reporting that his outpost had been driven back out of LUTZKAMPEN. Shortly thereafter an order came from Regiment directing that the 2d Bn assist "B" Company of the 112th in any way possible, and a platoon of "G" Company was sent down to help fill the gap between the two Regiments, with the understanding it would operate under the control of "B" Company 112th Infantry Regiment. When the "B" Company Commander, 112th Infantry had returned to his CP.. he telephoned that he was short of ammunition, and 5,000 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition were dispatched to him. After the enemy had infiltrated through and cut off “B” Company from the 112th Infantry Regiment it became attached to the 2d Bn 424th Infantry Regiment and remained with them until contact was reestablish between 112th and —? —?
After the -? -? -? flurry of Infantry activity in the morning of the 16th the front of the 2d Bn was surprisingly quiet for the remainder of the day, and scattered artillery fire was all that was encountered. Strong patrols operated in the Bn area on the night of 16 December, and at 2200 many trip wires were sprung, in front of "G" Company setting off flares. Enemy infantry advanced close enough to lob grenades into the "G" Company foxholes, and a smaller group also engaged "F" Company in a brief fire fight. Artillery fire delivered in front of the wire repulsed the patrols.
At daybreak on 17 December, a new enemy
artillery barrage commenced, followed by an Infantry attack. "G" Company
was hit the hardest, and suffered about 10 battle fatigue cases. In the
afternoon the regiments withdrawal was ordered, and the Bn had a choice of
withdrawing cross-country or employing road which the Engineers had constructed
out of HECKHUSCHEID. Finally, the Bn split into three groups- one group
of most of the vehicles going by road, most of the foot troops leaving
cross-country, and third group of scattered remnants of foot. The troops and
seven vehicles leaving last by road, close to
On the night of 21 December, Lt. Logan when down to BEILER with orders from the 112th to defend the zone just south of OUDLER. By the time he had return to the 2d Bn CP.. these orders had been canceled, and 112th and the 424th were withdrawn to the COMMANSTER area. In general the 2d Bn and responsibility for the defense around MALDINGEN. One —? —? —? –?ose around ALDRINGEN (E Co), "F" Company was placed around MALDINGEN and "G" Company west of BRAUNLAUF. A company of medium tanks was in the defense east of MALDINGEN. a screening shield of light tanks east of BRAUNLAUF, and attached tank destroyers north of MALDINGEN.
In the withdraw from this area, the 7th Armored Division materially assisted the 2d Bn in getting out safely. Lt. Logan says that “some General” came around and told Colonel Umanoff “get your men and ride on anything you can” this included jeep's, trailers and kitchen trucks as well as Armored vehicles. "E" Company had a very tough time getting out; it had crawled under fire from ALDRINGEN back to BEHO, where the 7th Armored picked it up and put it on half tracks.
On 25 December, the 2d Bn moved at 0700 to the vicinity of HARRE At 1400, the 2d Bn moved to CHENE-AL-PIERRE and with the 48 and 23rd Armored Infantry and a platoon of tanks attacked towards MANHAY. The 2d Bn attacked south along the west side of highway N15. “The results were pitiful,” according to Lt. Logan, what had gone as the strongest battalion of the regiment came out cut to ribbons. 35 percent casualties is just a guess. We had to ask for aid to evacuate the wounded, and then they shot at the aid man. Jerry had holed-up in the cellars of GRANDMENIL and MANHAY and were throwing knee-high fire which raked all approaches. Armor in the towns had their guns well zeroed along the approaches, and a Bn could advance no closer than 50 to 75 yards from MANHAY. About dark, short of the objective the Bn was ordered to pull back to high ground north of Manhay. In withdrawing, heavy casualties were again suffered from barrages of 88’s which walked up and down the lines all the way back.
On 26 December, "G" Company was detached from the Bn and placed ? —?
Lt. Colonel Leonard Umanoff was placed on special duty with Division Headquarters and Lt. Colonel Orville M. Hewitt (regimental executive officer) assumed command of the 2d Bn.
Colonel Hewitt lead the 2d battalion [?] on the
27 December in attack to secure the line between the towns of MANHAY and
GRANDMENIL. By this time the 82nd Airborne Division had taken MANHAY
and ALDUS and elements of the 75th Infantry Division were in the
outskirts of GRANDMENIL. "E" Company was on the left,
"F" Company in the center, and "H" Company (heavy weapons)
had been equipped with rifles and advanced as a rifle company on the west flank
of the Bn. The 2d Bn moved down the northern edge of Manhay, and succeeded in
securing the east-west road lying approximately 400 yards north of MANHAY.
In the advance the 2d Bn had part of the 106th RECON Troop on
its right flank and "L" Company, 424th Infantry Regiment on its left
flank. The Bn then dug in north of MANHAY and held defensive positions
in the face of long-range machine gun fire and occasional artillery until
relieved on
End of statement.....
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